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I. INTRODUCTION 
n United States v. Microsoft,1 the infamous antitrust trial starting in 
the late 1990s, a key contention was that Microsoft was conspiring 
against Sun Microsystems.2 An internal Bill Gates e-mail surfaced in 
which he asks, “Do we have a clear plan on what we want Apple to do 
to undermine Sun?”3 When confronted with a transcript of the e-mail 
in his videotaped deposition, Gates claimed that he did not remember 
sending it.4 However, the e-mail proved to be incredibly damaging to 
his defense and over time has become the classic example of how an e-
mail can serve as convincing evidence of a crime or wrong doing, or a 
“smoking gun.” 
In the modern era of technology, 294 billion e-mails are produced 
every day creating electronic discovery (hereinafter “e-discovery”) 
dilemmas for lawyers and judges throughout the country on a regular 
basis.5 The technological advancements of the twenty-first century 
have resulted in an enormous amount of electronically stored 
information (hereinafter “ESI”) that can become discoverable in 
virtually any lawsuit. In today’s digital age, e-mail has practically 
become our default mode of communication. An e-mail address is so 
vital to an individual’s life that it has evolved into more than a means 
of communication. Today, an e-mail address represents a digital 
blueprint of a person’s life, highlighting one’s financial position, 
business associations, and personal interests. E-mails operate as 
smoking guns in modern litigation because this medium of 
communication invokes little precaution with its wording and subject 
matter. Further, most individuals do not anticipate that their e-mails 
will become a source of discoverable information in a lawsuit. 
According to a recent study, sanctions for e-discovery violations 
are occurring more frequently than ever.6 From January 1, 2000, 
through January 1, 2010, the study indicates that of the 381 federal 
cases in which sanctions for e-discovery violations were sought, 215 
                                                            
1 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). 
2 See id. 
3 Susan Garland, This Version of Bill Gates Has a Memory Problem (Nov. 2, 
1998, 8 p.m.), http://www.businessweek.com/Microsoft/updates/up81102a.htm. 
4 Id. 
5 Internet 2010 in Numbers, ROYAL.PINGDOM.COM, (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal
.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers. 
6 See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the 
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790 (2010). 
I 
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resulted in sanctions being awarded.7 Defendants were sanctioned for 
e-discovery violations nearly three times more than plaintiffs in 
various cases throughout the country.8 Some of the sanctions were 
especially severe and included default judgments, adverse jury 
instructions, and large monetary fines.9 The number one reason for 
imposing sanctions was a failure to preserve electronic evidence, 
which was followed by a failure to produce ESI when responding to a 
discovery request.10 
An attorney’s role in handling the discovery of e-mails is a crucial 
one. Therefore, every attorney must become aware of the vital role e-
discovery plays in modern litigation in order to diligently and 
competently represent their clients. As the technology of the day 
continues to evolve, modern litigators must adapt and grow with it by 
becoming proficient in this new area of law. An attorney who fails to 
pursue the discovery of e-mails risks leaving unexamined a large 
quantity of information that could have a decisive impact on the 
outcome of litigation.11 
This note serves as a guide for attorneys on how to properly handle 
the preservation and discovery of e-mails and not subject oneself to the 
risk of being sanctioned. Part II will clarify the level of due diligence 
required to comply with a discovery request by explaining the rules 
that frame the law of e-discovery and providing case law supporting 
the due diligence standard. Part III will address resolving e-discovery 
disputes, followed by Part IV, the conclusion. 
II. THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD 
A challenge in the modern era of law is for an attorney to locate 
and retrieve all pertinent e-mails in connection with an e-discovery 
request; however, the cost of diligently producing e-mails outweighs 
the risk of subjecting yourself to sanctions for failing to preserve, 
produce, or maintain them. 
The year 2006 can be considered the beginning of the modern era 
in e-discovery jurisprudence. In that year, Federal Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 
37, and 45 were amended to directly address ESI in an attempt to bring 
                                                            
7 Id. at 848. 
8 Id. at 803. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g., Siemens Solar Indus. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 93 Civ. 1126, 1994 
WL 86368, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994). 
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clarity and standardization to this vague area of law.12 The 
amendments addressed a call for reform made by legal scholars13 and 
codified federal judicial findings that stated emphatically “it is black 
letter law computerized data is discoverable.”14 
A. Preservation of E-Mails 
In the context of e-discovery, an attorney’s duty of due diligence 
begins with the preservation of e-mails. The determination of the 
“trigger point,” at which preservation becomes necessary, is very fact 
sensitive and extremely important.15 Black letter law has established 
that the duty to preserve e-mails extends to the period before litigation 
when a party reasonably should know that evidence may be relevant to 
anticipated litigation.16 A plaintiff’s duty is more often triggered 
before litigation commences, in large part because plaintiffs control 
the timing of litigation.17  
Moreover, case law holds that “[a] formal discovery request is not 
necessary to trigger the duty to preserve evidence.”18 Thus, the duty 
exists for a defendant, at the latest, when the defendant is served with 
the complaint.19 Such a duty is ongoing, and a party must ensure that 
relevant e-mails are preserved on a continuing basis.20 The duty of 
preservation requires reasonable and good-faith efforts by a party to 
retain their e-mails.21 It is imperative that a party preserves their e-
                                                            
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45. 
13 Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil 
Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C.L. REV. 327, 346 (2000). 
14 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (“Today it is black letter law that computerized data is 
discoverable if relevant.”); see also Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 
L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Electronic documents 
are no less subject to disclosure than paper records.”). 
15 E.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am., 685 
F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is well established that the duty to 
preserve e-mails arises when a party reasonably anticipates litigation.”). 
16 Id. at 466. 
17 E.g., Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 340 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (holding that a duty to preserve arose when plaintiff retained counsel in 
connection with potential legal action but had not yet identified responsible parties). 
18 E.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., L.L.C., No. 05-C-3003, 2006 WL 
1308629 at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006). 
19 See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 197 (D.S.C. 2008). 
20 E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C. (Zubulake II), 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
21 E.g., Pension Comm., 685 F.Supp.2d at 464. 
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mails after the trigger point in litigation because it has become 
increasing clear that modern day courts will not hesitate to sanction 
lawyers for a failure to adhere to this clearly established standard.22 
In order to comply with the duty of preservation, an attorney must 
notify his client to place a “litigation hold” on all relevant e-mails at 
the trigger point in litigation.23 Simply meaning, all e-mails that are 
reasonably accessible and relevant must be preserved.24 However, 
authorities are split on whether the duty of preservation extends to e-
mails that are not reasonably accessible.25 For that reason, parties 
should preserve all of their e-mails unless they have evidence to prove 
that certain e-mails are not reasonably accessible because it would 
place an undue burden on the party to produce them.26 If there is an 
uncertainty as to whether the party can prove this, then he should be 
sure to preserve the messages in question. 
In the business context, the duty to preserve e-mails is imposed 
throughout the company, creating an organizational duty of 
preservation. Counsel should take steps to preserve discoverable 
information including: (1) issuing a litigation hold at the outset of 
litigation or whenever litigation is reasonably anticipated and should 
periodically re-issue the hold so that new employees are aware of it, 
and so it is fresh in the minds of all employees; (2) communicating 
directly with the “key players” in the litigation, namely the employees 
most likely to have relevant information, and periodically remind them 
of preservation duty; and (3) instruct all employees to produce 
electronic copies of their relevant active files.27 If an organization has 
an e-mail retention or destruction policy, it is obligated to suspend that 
policy once the duty of preservation has been triggered.28 
In Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension Plan v. 
Banc of America,29 Justice Scheindlin noted that “it is well established 
that the duty to preserve evidence arises when a party reasonably 
anticipates litigation.”30 The court held that in the e-discovery context, 
a failure to issue a written litigation hold constitutes gross negligence 
                                                            
22 E.g., Zubulake II, 229 F.R.D. at 436–37. 
23 Id. at 431. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010). 
27 Zubulake II, 229 F.R.D. at 433–34. 
28 Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 524. 
29 Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 685 
F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
30 Id. at 466. 
188 UMass Law Review v. 7 | 182 
because that failure is likely to result in the destruction of relevant 
information.31 Further, the court held that a failure to preserve the e-
mails of former employees that are in a party’s possession, custody, or 
control can also support a finding of gross negligence.32 In the case at 
hand, the plaintiffs were the spoliators and the court did not hesitate to 
sanction them by ordering an adverse inference against them, imposing 
monetary sanctions on each of the spoliators, and awarding the 
defendants their reasonable costs, including attorneys’ fees associated 
with the spoliation.33 
The above case illustrates that it is now beyond question that if a 
party is already embroiled in or reasonably anticipates litigation, that 
current or prospective litigant, together with its counsel, absolutely 
must issue a timely, written litigation hold and implement and oversee 
the execution of that hold diligently and in good faith, or face 
sanctions.34 
B. Early Attention to E-Mails 
Early attention to ESI is crucial in order to control the scope and 
expense of e-discovery and to avoid potential disputes.35 Addressing 
the issue at the onset of litigation is the most effective way to protect 
oneself from future sanctions. An attorney must have a specific 
understanding of his client’s electronic storage system prior to meeting 
with the opposing party. With this information, the parties can develop 
an e-discovery plan tailored to the capabilities of each party’s 
computer system. At the Rule 26(f) conference, special attention must 
be paid to e-mails and a good faith attempt should be made to define 
the scope of e-discovery.36 
Under the Federal Rules, a Rule 26(f) conference between the 
parties to draft a discovery plan must include a discussion of any 
issues relating to disclosure or discovery of ESI, including the forms or 
form in which it should be produced.37 Form 35 may include a report 
                                                            
31 Id. at 465. 
32 Id. at 468. 
33 Id. at 470-71, 497. 
34 Melissa DeHonney & Jeffrey L. Nagel, Zubulake Revisited: Pension 
Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America 
Securities, LLC, GIBBONSLAW.COM (Jan. 28 2010), http://www.gibbonslaw.com
/news_publications/articles.php?action=display_publication&publication_id=2983. 
35 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 34, 45 (2006 advisory committee’s 
notes). 
36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (2006 advisory committee’s note). 
37
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C). 
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to the court regarding this discussion and be submitted prior to the 
courts’ scheduling order.38 Rule 16 has been amended to state that a 
scheduling order issued at a pretrial conference may address 
“disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information.”39 
The parties should lobby fort a pretrial order that addresses ESI 
because in many instances the court’s involvement early in litigation 
can alert the court of potential issues and help avoid difficulties that 
might otherwise arise later in the discovery process. The parties can 
potentially save time and money by addressing the discovery of e-
mails at the beginning of litigation and avoid costs incurred in the 
expensive and time-consuming e-discovery process. Furthermore, 
counsel should consult the local rules of his jurisdiction before a 
discovery planning conference because they may impose additional or 
specific requirements concerning ESI. 
In National Day Laborer Organizing Network v. United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency,40 Justice Scheindlin 
explains how important it is to pay early attention to ESI in modern 
day lawsuits: 
Once again, this Court is required to rule on an e-discovery issue 
that could have been avoided had the parties had the good sense to 
“meet and confer,” “cooperate” and generally make every effort to 
“communicate” as to the form in which ESI would be produced. 
The quoted words are found in opinion after opinion and yet 
lawyers fail to take the necessary steps to fulfill their obligations to 
each other and to the court… all lawyers -- even highly respected 
private lawyers, Government lawyers, and professors of law -- 
need to make greater efforts to comply with the expectations that 
courts now demand of counsel with respect to expensive and time-
consuming document production. Lawyers are all too ready to 
point the finger at the courts and the Rules for increasing the 
expense of litigation, but that expense could be greatly diminished 
if lawyers met their own obligations to ensure that document 
production is handled as expeditiously and inexpensively as 




 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii). 
39 Id. 
40 Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Networks v. U. S. Immigr. and Cust. Enforcement 
Agency, No. 10 Civ. 3488, 2011 WL 381625 at * 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
41 Id. (Opinion and Order withdrawn per order from court June 17, 2011, and has 
no precedential value. However, Justice Scheindlin’s discussion on the importance of 
paying early attention to ESI is applicable to show the current state of e-discovery 
law). 
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C. Proportionality in E-Discovery 
A discovery request for the production of documents aimed at 
some electronic form is no different, theoretically, from a request for 
documents contained in an office file cabinet.42 Likewise, a party may 
request that the opposing party produce and permit inspection, 
copying, testing, or sampling of ESI that is in the opposing parties’ 
control or possession.43 However, as the court noted in Rodriguez-
Torres v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, “discovery is 
not meant to serve as a fishing expedition.”44 
The cost of e-discovery has skyrocketed as more and more 
information is being electronically stored simply because it is cheaper 
and easier to retain and preserve than paper documents. Therefore, 
litigants and courts should approach e-discovery differently depending 
on what is at stake in the case and how complex the issues are 
expected to be. Courts should apply the concept of proportionality to 
the scope of e-discovery, and not force discovery when the cost or 
burden is disproportionately large compared to what is at stake in the 
litigation.45 As the court explained in Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. 
Cammarata, “[w]hether preservation or discovery conduct is 
acceptable in a case depends on what is reasonable, and that in turn 
depends on whether what was done—or not done—was proportional 
to that case and consistent with clearly established standards.”46 
D. Production of E-Mails 
The newly amended Rule 34 includes ESI within the definition of 
discoverable information. Under the rule, a requesting party may 
designate the form or forms in which e-mails should be produced.47 If 
                                                            
42 See, e.g., Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 1999 WL 462015, at *6 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. June 16, 1999). 
43 See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 954 F.2d 349, 352–53 (6th Cir. 1992); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
44 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 
2010). 
45 John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 455, 460 (2010). 
46 Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammerata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010); But see Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 
436 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the standard set forth in Rimkus to be “too amorphous” 
and holding that, “until a more precise definition is created by rule, a party is well-
advised to retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) in 
existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches”). 
47
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C). 
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the requesting party has not specified a form of production, the 
responding party should let opposing counsel know in advance the 
form in which he intends to produce his e-mails. Advance notice and 
communication between the parties will save costs by avoiding 
potential disputes and duplicate production.48 
The rule allows the responding party to produce e-mails in the 
form in which they are ordinarily maintained, or in a reasonably usable 
format.49 The right of the requesting party to receive e-mails in their 
original form could potentially be waived if a specific demand for e-
mails to be produced in native format50 is not made at the beginning of 
discovery.51 
If the responding party chooses to object to production of e-mails 
in the form sought, he must include within his objection the form he 
intends to produce his e-mails.52 If the requesting party disagrees with 
the counterproposal, the parties should diligently attempt to resolve the 
disagreement. If they cannot, the requesting party may make a motion 
to compel production in the requested form. However, the court’s 
decision may drive up costs for both parties. 
E. Accessible Versus Inaccessible E-Mails 
Rule 26 has been revised under the amendments to provide that a 
party must produce ESI as part of its required initial disclosures.53 
When a discovery request for the production of e-mails is made, the 
responding party must produce all e-mails that are reasonably 
accessible; however, there is no duty on the responding party to 
                                                            
48 Chapman v. General Bd. of Pension and Health Benefits of the United 
Methodist Church, Inc., No. 09 C-3474, 2010 WL 2679961, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 
2010); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D). 
49 See, e.g., India Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 194 
(E.D. Wis. 2006) (“A party may request information in a specific electronic format, 
but if it instead simply asks for ‘documents’ . . . production in electronic form is not 
required.”). 
50 Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery & Digital Information 
Management (2nd Ed.), http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did
=TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf. at 35 (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) (“Native format” is the 
format of a file as it was created inside a computer software format, i.e. documents 
generated in Microsoft Word have a “.doc” native format.). 
51 See, e.g., Chapman, 2010 WL 2679961, at *5 (explaining that the federal rules 
do not require production of electronic records in native format, when requesting 
party did not request production in that format; once production was made in hard-
copy form, producing party would not be required to re-produce in native form). 
52
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D). 
53
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
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produce e-mails that are “not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost.”54 
The amended rule creates a two-tiered approach to the production 
of ESI, making a distinction between information that is reasonably 
accessible and that which is not.55 Under the first tier, a party must 
produce e-mails that are reasonably accessible as long as they are 
relevant and not privileged.56 Under the second tier, a responding party 
does not need to produce e-mails from sources that it identifies as not 
reasonably accessible because of an undue burden or cost.57 Whether 
e-mails are accessible or inaccessible hinges largely on the media 
through which it is stored.58 Accessible data is stored in a readily 
usable format; “although the time it takes to actually access that data 
ranges from milliseconds to days, the data does not need to be restored 
or otherwise manipulated to be usable.”59 Inaccessible data is not 
readily usable, i.e. information must be reconstructed, lost data must 
be restored, fragmented data must be de-fragmented, and all before it 
is usable.60 
If counsel objects to an e-discovery request aimed at e-mails, the 
burden is on the objecting party to make the required showing that the 
e-mails sought are not reasonably accessible.61 Before a responding 
party brings a burdensomeness argument before the court, he must 
make a diligent, good faith effort to produce the e-mails demanded at 
the lowest possible cost.62 A party objecting to the discovery of e-
mails on the ground that they are not reasonably accessible must be 
certain not to make general, vague objections.63 The party should 
strongly consider retaining an e-discovery expert to certify that the e-
mails sought are not reasonably accessible and provide other evidence 
                                                            
54
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
55 See, e.g., Zubalake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubalake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 
315–18; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
56 See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 315, 318–22; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2). 
57 Zubalake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
58 Id. at 318. 
59 Id. at 320. 
60 Id. 
61
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
62 See, e.g., Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C-07-532, 
2008 WL 1805727, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008). 
63 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Church & Dwight Co., 747 F. Supp. 2d 3, 7 
(D.D.C. 2010). 
2012 The Discoverability of E-Mail 193 
to support his objection. Vague and unsupported assertions of undue 
burden will inevitably be rejected by the court.64 
Discovery imposes an undue burden or expense when the burden 
“outweighs its benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving 
the issues.”65 Some burden on the responding party is to be expected 
and, simply put, the failure to provide supporting evidence to a 
burdensome argument will not result in a favorable outcome.66 To 
succeed in establishing that the requested discovery will be 
disproportionately burdensome, a party will be required to provide the 
court with evidence about the costs or personnel hours that will be 
required to obtain, review, and produce the requested information.67 
Courts have found e-mails not to be reasonably accessible because 
of an undue burden on the responding party.68 In Rodriquez-Torres, 
the plaintiffs sought through discovery “all e-mail communications 
and calendar entries describing, relating or referring to plaintiff Vicky 
Rodriguez, both inbound and outbound from co-defendant GDB’s 
messaging system servers” for a three-year period spanning from 2007 
through 2009.69 The parties submitted a report which estimated the 
cost of producing the ESI at $35,000.70 The court found that $35,000 
was “too high of a cost for the production of the requested [ESI] in this 
type of action.”71 In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs sought $1.4 
million dollars in compensatory damages.72 The court denied 
plaintiffs’ motion to compel the production of e-mails, ruling they 
were not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2)(B).73 
F. Protected E-Mails 
Discoverable information is no longer stored in boxes and file 
cabinets but rather in digital technologies such as e-mail accounts 
within a computer hard drive. Generally, a party responding to a 
                                                            
64 See, e.g., Mikron Indu., Inc., 2008 WL 1805727, at *2. 
65 Zubalake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubalake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 318. 
66 Fed. Trade Comm’n, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 5. 
67 Id. at 4. 
68 E.g., Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 43 (D.P.R. 
2010). 
69 Id. at 43. 
70 Id. at 44. 
71 Id. 
72 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40 (D.P.R. 2010). 
73 Id. at 45. 
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discovery request for e-mails will have to provide an abnormally large 
volume of information. The increased amount of data that an attorney 
must now produce makes it more difficult to determine if such ESI 
contains privileged information. The Federal Rules address this risk by 
providing that if a party inadvertently provides privileged or trial 
preparation information, a party must promptly return, sequester, or 
destroy the information.74 
A responding party does not have to produce e-mails that are 
protected by the attorney-client privilege.75 “[A]ttorney-client 
privilege protects communications if: (1) the relation of attorney and 
client existed at the time the communication was made, (2) the 
communication was made in confidence, (3) the communication 
relates to a matter about which the attorney is being professionally 
consulted, (4) the communication was made in the course of giving or 
seeking legal advice for a proper purpose although litigation need not 
be contemplated, and (5) the client has not waived the privilege.”76 
E-mail communication between an attorney and client must be 
confidential in order to qualify for the attorney-client privilege.77 The 
attorney-client privilege does not apply to e-mails that are 
informational only, even when sent to or from an attorney.78 A 
responding party cannot make a blanket claim of privilege but must 
provide specific and articulate evidence to show that an e-mail is 
protected.79 Such evidence may include producing a test sample of the 
information sought and explaining how the privilege exists. The courts 
will not allow responding parties to use a blanket attorney-client 
privilege objection as a tool to block the discovery of e-mails.80 
Amended Rule 37 now contains what is commonly referred to as a 
“safe harbor” provision. The rule states that “absent exceptional 
circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a 
                                                            
74
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
75 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A). 
76 Isom v. Bank of Am., N.A., 628 S.E.2d 458, 462 (N.C. App. 2006). 
77 A & H Mgmt. Servs. v. Chafflose Corp., No. 08-3809, slip op. at 1 (6th Cir. 
Feb. 3, 2009). 
78 Isom, 628 S.E.2d at 462. 
79 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Morelli, 143 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); 
see also Dept. of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 139 F.R.D. 295, 300 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Blanket claims asserting attorney client privileges are 
improper.”). 
80 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Morelli, 143 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); 
see also Dept. of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 139 F.R.D. 295, 300 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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party for failing to provide ESI lost as a result of the routine, good-
faith operation of an electronic information system.”81 
G. Spoliation of E-Mails 
At no point in time should a responding party alter or destroy e-
mails. As e-discovery jurisprudence matures, the fact that e-mails were 
deleted because of carelessness, and not bad faith, will not save a 
responding party from being sanctioned.82 The most important duty on 
the responding party is the preservation of relevant e-mails and to 
ensure that they are not materially altered or deleted. 
“Spoliation of evidence” is the destruction or material alteration of 
evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.83 In addition 
to Rule 37, “the right to impose sanctions for spoliation arises from a 
court’s inherent power to control the judicial process and litigation, but 
the power is limited to that necessary to remedy conduct which abuses 
the judicial process.”84 There are countless cases that demonstrate 
courts’ willingness to impose sanctions if an attorney fails to prevent 
his clients from materially altering or destroying e-mails.85 
The landmark case, Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,86 
serves as an example of how prevalent spoliation of e-mails has 
become in modern litigation. Justice Grimm described this case as, 
“the single most egregious example of spoliation that I have 
encountered in any case that I have handled or in any case described in 
the legion of spoliation cases I have read in nearly fourteen years on 
the bench.”87  
In the case, the defendants demonstrated an unwillingness to 
preserve e-mails that were relevant to litigation. When litigation was 
reasonably foreseeable the defendants failed to place a litigation hold 
on their e-mails, deleted e-mails after the plaintiff filed suit, failed to 
preserve e-mails after the plaintiff demanded their preservation, and 
                                                            
81
 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); But see, e.g., Driggin v. Am. Sec. Alarm Co., 141 F. 
Supp. 2d 113, 123 (D. Me. 2000) (holding that no showing of bad faith was required, 
and that mere carelessness resulting in destruction or deletion of e-mails was 
sufficient to impose sanctions). 
82 Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am., 685 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 467–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
83 Victor Stanley, Inc., v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 516 (D. Md. 
2010). 
84 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 465. 
85 See, e.g., Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 541. 
86 Id. at 497. 
87 Id. at 515. 
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deleted e-mails after the court issued numerous preservation orders.88 
The court found that the defendants engaged in willful, bad faith 
misconduct, and implemented an adverse inference that the deleted 
information was relevant. Further, the court granted monetary 
sanctions, including fees and costs associated with all e-discovery 
occurring as a result of the defendant’s spoliation, and ordered that the 
defendant’s president be imprisoned for up to two years unless and 
until he paid plaintiff’s fees and costs.89 This case provides an 
important lesson to lawyers of the severe consequences that courts will 
impose if those lawyers partake in the spoliation of ESI. 
Aside from the outrageous behavior of the defendants, this case 
gained national recognition because Justice Grimm provided a twelve-
page chart citing e-discovery cases from the various circuits as an 
attempt to show the split in legal standards that have been established 
to impose sanctions.90 
H. Discovery of E-Mails Held by Third Parties 
Rule 45 has been amended to address the production of documents 
by third parties pursuant to a subpoena. If a subpoena does not specify 
a form for producing ESI, the person responding must produce it in the 
form it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form.91 
Moreover, the responding party does not need to produce the same ESI 
in more than one form and does not have to produce e-mails from 
sources that he identifies as not reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or cost.92 
The Stored Communications Act93 (hereinafter “SCA”) forms part 
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act94 (hereinafter “ECPA”) 
and sets out the provisions for privacy protections, access, use, 
interception, and disclosure of electronic communications.95 The law 
was enacted in 1986 and covers various forms of wire and electronic 
communications, including e-mails.96 The SCA addresses voluntary 
                                                            
88 Id. at 497. 
89 Id. at 541 (noting the jail sentence was overturned on appeal). 
90 Id. at 542–53. 
91
 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1)(B). 
92 Id. 
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1986). 
94 See id. § 2510. 
95 See id. § 2511. 
96 See id. § 2510(12); see, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 
(1st Cir. 2005). 
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and compelled disclosure of stored electronic communications held by 
third-party internet service providers .97 
The SCA provides that any “person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly 
divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while 
in electronic storage by that service.”98 The statute provides exceptions 
under which the provider may divulge the contents of a 
communication.99 Two notable and commonly relied upon exceptions 
are first, allowing the provider to release the requested information 
upon receiving lawful consent of the originator, and an addressee, an 
intended recipient, or the subscriber in the case of remote service; and 
second, allowing the provider to release the requested information 
upon a court order.100 
In civil litigation there is a great debate over whether a defendant 
or third party company must comply with a court order for discovery 
aimed at e-mails stored by internet service providers.101 Some courts 
have held that an internet service provider does not have to produce e-
mails within its storage system even when presented with a court 
order.102 The Digital Due Process Coalition, which consists of 
attorneys, law school students, and companies such as Google and 
Facebook, is fighting emphatically to amend the ECPA in an attempt 
to bring clarity to this area of law within the realm of the developing e-
discovery jurisprudence.103 
                                                            
97 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1986). 
98 Id. § 2702(a)(1). 
99 Id. § 2702(b). 
100 Id. §§ 2701(c), 2518(3); but see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 253 
F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“ECPA § 2702 contains no exception for 
disclosure of [the content of] communications pursuant to civil discovery requests.”). 
101 See, e.g., Thayer v. Chiczewski, 2009 WL 2957317, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 
2009) (“[M]ost courts have concluded that third parties cannot be compelled to 
disclose electronic communications pursuant to a civil, as opposed to criminal, 
discovery subpoena.”). 
102 E.g., O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 90–91 (Cal. App. 2006) 
(finding that contents of communications stored by an internet service provider may 
not be disclosed to civil litigants even when presented with a civil subpoena). 
103
 DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, MODERNIZING SURVEILLANCE LAWS FOR THE 
INTERNET AGE, http://digitaldueprocess.org (last visited May 16, 2012). 
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III. RESOLVING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY DISPUTES 
A. Motion for a Protective Order 
A party responding to a discovery request for the production of e-
mails can file a motion for a protective order. The party from whom 
discovery is sought must show that the e-mails are not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost when moving for a 
protective order.104 If such a showing is made, the court may 
nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party 
shows good cause.105 The requesting party can demonstrate good cause 
by showing: (1) the information cannot be obtained from another 
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) 
the responding party has had ample opportunity to obtain the 
information; or (3) that the benefit of the information outweighs the 
burden of its production considering the needs of the case, amount in 
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action, and the importance of discovery in resolving the 
issues.106 
The court has broad discretion to issue protective orders.107 The 
court’s power includes, but is not limited to, blocking discovery, 
setting terms and conditions on discovery, tailoring discovery requests, 
shifting costs, and ordering sampling or testing to assess likelihood of 
finding relevant information.108 The court further noted in Rodriquez-
Torres that it could order production of the e-mails, despite the 
excessive cost, if good cause could be shown by the plaintiffs.109 
However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ request was merely a 
“fishing expedition” and denied their motion to compel; holding that 
“just because emails are more likely to lead to inappropriate comments 
is not a sufficient basis to believe that the [ESI] requested here will 




 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
105 Id. 
106
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii). 
107
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
108 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A)–(H); see, e.g., Mikron Indus., Inc. 
v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. C-07-532, WL 1805727, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 21, 2008). 
109 Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40, 44 (D.P.R. 
2010). 
110 Id. 
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If the court finds that the e-mails are not reasonably accessible but 
nonetheless orders production because the requesting party has shown 
good cause, then the court should conduct a cost shifting analysis. In 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., Judge Scheindlin set forth a seven-
factor test to determine if the cost of production should shift from the 
producing party to the requesting party. No one factor is determinative 
and the factors that should be considered are: (1) the extent the 
requested discovery specifically is tailored to relevant information; (2) 
the availability of such information; (3) the total amount of production 
versus the amount in controversy; (4) total cost of production versus 
each party’s available resources; (5) relative ability of each party to 
control costs and incentive to do so; (6) importance of the issues at 
stake; and (7) relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information.111 The majority rule set forth in Zubalake is that cost 
shifting should only be considered for discovery of e-mails that are not 
reasonably accessible.112  
However, a minority of courts across the country have declined to 
follow the rule that cost shifting applies only to the discovery of e-
mails that are not reasonably accessible.113 In Multitechnology 
Services, L.P. v. Verizon Southwest, the court rejects the argument that 
cost shifting is only appropriate when ESI is not reasonably accessible, 
holding that “Zubulake is a district court opinion without binding 
authority.”114 The court further found that “requiring the parties to 
evenly shoulder the expense is the most effective resolution because it 
balances the benefit of the discovery . . . and provides . . . incentive to 
manage costs it incurs.”115 The court concluded by stating “it is 
appropriate to classify the expense [from discovery of ESI] as court 
costs that can be recovered by the prevailing party.”116 
B. Sanctions 
As e-discovery jurisprudence continues to be defined, courts are 
sending the message that improper conduct will not be tolerated by 
awarding sanctions at a steadily increasing pace. An attorney should 
move for sanctions if he suspects that opposing counsel has failed to 
                                                            
111 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
112 Id. at 318. 
113 See, e.g., Multitech. Serv. v. Verizon Sw., No. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 WL 
1553480, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004). 
114 Id. at *1. 
115 Id. at *2. 
116 Id. 
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preserve or has deleted e-mails that are relevant to pending litigation. 
Sanctions for a failure to preserve e-mails or the spoliation of e-mails 
have included costs, attorneys’ fees, and fines, which not only 
compensate the prejudiced party but also punish the offending party 
for its actions and deter the litigant’s conduct.117 Under certain 
circumstances, a court may order an adverse inference instruction if a 
party breaches his duty of preservation or materially alters e-mails.118 
Further, under very severe circumstances, a court has the authority to 
impose the ultimate sanction and order a default judgment for the 
spoliation of e-mails.119 
An attorney breaches his duty of preservation when he displays an 
unwillingness to preserve e-mails or if he shows a level of carelessness 
that is disproportionate to clearly established standards.120 Black-letter 
law has established that “it is now beyond question that if a party is 
already embroiled in or reasonably anticipates litigation, that current or 
prospective litigant, together with its counsel, absolutely must issue a 
timely, written litigation hold and implement and oversee the 
execution of that hold diligently and in good faith, or face 
sanctions.”121 Opposing counsel should move for sanctions if an 
attorney does not conform to this established duty of preservation. 
The Fourth Circuit held that in order to prove spoliation that 
warrants a sanction, “A party must show: (1) the party having control 
over the ESI had an obligation to preserve it when it was destroyed or 
altered; (2) the destruction or loss was accompanied by a culpable state 
of mind; and (3) the e-mail that was destroyed or altered was relevant 
to the claims or defenses of the party that sought discovery of the 
spoliated evidence, to the extent that a reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that the lost e-mail would have supported the claims or 
defenses of the party that sought it.”122 District courts in the Second, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits also used these factors to 
determine if spoliation rises to a level that requires sanctions.123 The 
First, Third, and Tenth Circuit test to determine sanction-worthy 
spoliation is: (1) was there spoliation, and (2) if so, what sanctions are 
                                                            
117 Victor Stanley, Inc., v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 536 (D. Md. 
2010). 
118 Id. at 521. 
119 Id. at 535. 
120 See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
121 DeHonney, supra note 34. 
122 Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 520–21. 
123 Id. at 521. 
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appropriate, with state of mind only figuring into the second factor.124 
The Federal Circuit “applies the law of the regional circuit from which 
the case arose” when reviewing sanction orders.125 
Most circuits agree that in order to impose an adverse jury 
instruction for spoliation of e-mails, a court must find that the spoliator 
acted willfully in the destruction of evidence.126A court may order an 
adverse inference instruction for spoliation, which informs the jury 
that it may draw adverse inferences from the loss or destruction of 
evidence, by assuming that failure to preserve was because the 
spoliator was aware that the e-mail would have been detrimental.127 
The circuits seem to agree that in order to award a default 
judgment for spoliation of e-mails, a court must be able to conclude 
either that the spoliator’s conduct was so outrageous as to amount to a 
forfeiture of his claim or defense, or that the effect of the spoliator’s 
conduct was so prejudicial that it substantially denied the opposing 
party the ability to present or defend the claim.128 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The discoverability of e-mails is an area of law that every modern-
day lawyer must be familiar with in order to avoid the risk of being 
sanctioned. Over the past years, courts have awarded sanctions to 
moving parties at a steadily increasing pace. The sanctions for e-
discovery malpractice have included adverse jury instructions, default 
judgments, attorneys’ fees, large monetary fines, and in one instance, a 
jail sentence.129 If an attorney adheres to the following standard when 
dealing with e-mails throughout the course of litigation, then he should 
not face sanctions for e-discovery malpractice. 
An attorney’s duty of due diligence in e-discovery starts well 
before a formal discovery request is filed. He must first inform his 
clients of his duty of preservation. A party’s duty of preservation is 
triggered when he reasonably anticipates litigation.130 At this point in 
time, counsel must inform his clients to issue a written litigation hold 
                                                            
124 See id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 535. 
127 Id. at 535–36. 
128 Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 534–35 (D. Md. 
2010). 
129 See Willoughby, Jr. et al., supra note 6. 
130 Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am., 685 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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in order to preserve all e-mails. The litigation hold must suspend the 
party’s retention/deletion program until the lawsuit has ended.131 
Further, counsel is required to oversee the execution of the hold 
diligently and in good faith to ensure its effectiveness.132 
While the litigation hold is in effect, the party cannot partake in the 
spoliation of e-mails. As e-discovery jurisprudence continues to 
develop, it is clear that courts will not hesitate to enforce sanctions 
when spoliation of e-mails occurs. The fact that e-mails were deleted 
because of carelessness, and not bad faith, will not save a responding 
party from being sanctioned.133 Within the realm of e-discovery, one 
of the most important duties an attorney owes to his client is to educate 
them of the severe consequences that can occur if they fail to preserve 
their e-mails, or if they materially alter or delete them. 
An attorney must take the Rule 26(f) discovery planning 
conference seriously. The conference should be used as an opportunity 
to address e-mails early in litigation, to define the scope of e-
discovery, to decide on the form in which e-mails will be produced, to 
establish a proportional e-discovery plan as an attempt to control cost, 
and to notify the court of disputes that may arise in the e-discovery 
context. The results of this discussion should be reported to the court 
and a request should be made to have the court’s pretrial scheduling 
order state what e-mails should be produced and in which form.134 By 
addressing these issues at the discovery planning conference, an 
attorney will save his client from unnecessary costs that can occur 
during the expensive and time consuming e-discovery process. 
An attorney responding to an e-discovery request for e-mails 
should produce them in the form agreed to by the parties, ordered by 
the court, specified by the requesting party, or if no form is specified, 
in a form in which it is ordinarily maintained or a form that is 
reasonably usable.135 Should the responding attorney object to 
production of e-mails in the form sought, he must include within his 
objection the form in which he intends to produce his e-mails.136 If the 
requesting party disagrees with the counterproposal, the two sides will 
inevitably turn to the court to decide the issue. The court’s 
involvement to determine the form of production drives up the cost of 
                                                            
131 Id. 
132 DeHonney, supra note 34. 
133 Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467–68. 
134
 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii). 
135 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E). 
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 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D). 
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litigation and is precisely why the two sides should agree on the form 
of production for e-mails at the discovery planning conference. 
When responding to an e-discovery request, an attorney must 
produce all e-mails that are reasonably accessible and non-
privileged.137 The responding attorney does not have to produce e-
mails that are not reasonably accessible because of an undue burden or 
cost.138 The attorney cannot make a blanket claim that e-mails are not 
reasonably accessible, but rather they must provide the court with 
evidence showing the way the e-mails are stored and the personnel 
hours it would take to produce them.139 Further, an e-discovery expert 
should also be consulted to confirm that the e-mails are actually 
inaccessible. If the court requires the production of non-reasonably 
accessible e-mails because the opposing side shows good cause, the 
attorney should insist that cost shifting be applied.140 
Following this framework and establishing an open and continuous 
dialog with the court and opposing counsel should ensure that the 
attorney diligently and competently represented his clients and not 
subject him to possible sanctions. It is essential that modern-day 
lawyers become acquainted with the e-discovery standards of their 
jurisdiction and grasp the crucial role that discovery of e-mails plays in 
virtually every lawsuit. Modern technology is transforming the way 
individuals communicate and the way information is stored and courts 
are sending the message that improper conduct and ignorance will not 
be tolerated in this developing area of law by awarding sanctions at an 
alarmingly increasing pace. 
  
                                                            
137 See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 315, 318–22; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
138 Id. 
139 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Church & Dwight Co., 747 F. Supp. 2d 3, 4 
(D.D.C. 2010). 
140 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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2009 111 97 46 12 5 12 32 26.1% 
2008 90 71 42 15 6 11 30 26.2% 
2007 87 66 39 8 6 7 32 17.9% 
2006 68 55 32 5 7 6 26 18.8% 
2005 42 36 18 5 2 5 14 27.8% 
2004 35 29 21 5 3 7 14 33.3% 
2003 12 9 6 5 2 1 5 16.7% 
2002 7 6 3 0 0 1 2 33.3% 
2001 5 5 5 0 0 1 4 20.0% 
2000 6 5 3 1 0 0 3 0.0% 
1999 4 4 3 1 0 0 3 0.0% 
1998 4 4 3 0 1 1 2 33.3% 
1997 3 3 1 0 0 0 1 0.0% 
1996 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.0% 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 
1994 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 
1993 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 100.0% 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 
1991 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
1990 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
Total 479142 395 226 57 35 53 171 23% 
  
                                                            
141 Willoughby, Jr. et al., supra note 6, at 848 (Table created by the author. 
Information obtained from source.). 
142 Total written federal rulings. 
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Appendix C: Annual No. of E-Discovery Sanction Awards 144 
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